Staff Dishonesty in the Retail Sector: Understanding the Opportunities

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Purpose of the Presentation

Background to Staff Dishonesty
Methodology Used
Findings
Recommendations
Conclusions



A Perennial Concern



A Perennial Concern
Scale of the Problem



Scale of the Problem

Imprecise ArtOfficial Statistics of Limited Value



Extent of the Problem

Study	Estimates
Florida studies (1991 -)	40-47%
ECR studies (2000 and 2004)	24-28%
Retail Theft Barometer (2006)	28%
Food Marketing Institute (2006)	40%



Scale of the Problem

Imprecise Art
 Official Statistics of Limited Value
 Unknown Loss Clouds Measurement



A Perennial Concern
Scale of the Problem
Viewed as Highly Sensitive



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Overshadowed by External



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Previous Research



Previous Research

Focused Primarily on the Who, How Much and the Why Questions

- Interview General Retail Staff
- Analyse Company Statistics
- Interview Security Staff
- Theorise from Research Done in Other Areas



A Perennial Concern
Scale of the Problem
Viewed as Highly Sensitive
Overshadowed by External
Previous Research
Defining Staff Dishonesty



Definition of Dishonesty

- 'the unauthorised taking, control or transfer of money and/or property of the formal work organisation perpetrated by an employee during the course of occupational activity which is related to his or her employment' (Hollinger and Clarke, 1983)
- Focus Upon Property Deviance Rather than Production Deviance



A Perennial Concern Scale of the Problem Viewed as Highly Sensitive Overshadowed by External Previous Research Defining Staff Dishonesty Understanding Why



Understanding Why

External Financial Pressure Opportunity Job Dissatisfaction Poor Pay Company Culture Type of Staff Neutralisation of Behaviour



Aims and Objectives

- Gather real insights into how workers in the supply chain exploit company procedures and processes to steal cash and goods.
- Understand offender perspectives on current shrinkage management strategies in order to understand what currently works, what does not and what might work in the future.
- Provide a greater appreciation of the nuances of 'sweethearting' at the till and understand how operators do it, how they make sure they are not caught, and the types of till procedures that facilitate or inhibit this activity.



Methodology

Interviews with offenders 2 companies agreed to take part Total of 35 interviews completed Analysis of existing company records - Wilkinson's in the UK 15 taped interviews Interviews with security staff – Ahold: Poland and the Netherlands Questionnaires completed by security staff – Albert Heijn in the Netherlands – 31 questionnaires completed



Methodology

Limitations

- Representativeness of Data Set
- Reliability of Respondents
- Relatively Small Numbers
- The Data Set
 - Total of 74 Usable Cases
 - Highly Varied: €0.55 to over €150,000
 - From Pickers to Store Managers
 - Total of 99 'Dishonest' Events Analysed
- Meaning of 'dishonesty'
 - Theft of cash and goods
 - Serving family and friends
 - Claiming points on Loyalty Card
 - Reducing the price of items for own purchase
 - Allowing friends and family to use discount card **University** of

Type of Staff

Туре	Number
Till Operators	47
Shop Floor	12
Security Officers	4
Warehouse	4
Management	3
Chief Cashier	2
DC Pickers	2



Findings: Place of Offending

Туре	Number
Till	68
Warehouse	16
Shop Floor	5
Refund Counter	2
Retail Distribution Centre	2
Cash Office	2
Other	4



Offending at the Till

Туре

Stealing cash

Non scanning of items for family, friends or colleagues

Allowing family and friends to use staff discount card

Serving family and friends

Adding points to own loyalty card

Stealing phone top-up cards

Using and deliberately accepting counterfeit money

Short changing customers and stealing the cash

Stealing credit cards left behind inadvertently by customers

Stealing gift cards

Stealing discount vouchers

Last item voiding

Giving extra change to family and friends



Offending at the Till

Little effort to disguise
Multiple usage of till to cover tracks
Become greedier as their offending continues
Use quiet moments to remove cash or

straight after customer transaction



Non Scanning

'lots of staff were doing it for each other – I would do it at least once a week, felt a bit under pressure to do it as she [the other member of staff] can be quite dominating ... thought nobody would notice and it [the loss] would be put down to shoplifters'.



Serving Family and Friends

Not regarded as a problemViewed as minor misdemeanour



Offending in the Warehouse

Type

Eat stock

Walk out back of store with items

Hide items outside

Put items in clothing or bag

Hide/set aside stock to wait for discount



Other Areas of Offending

Cashier's Office
Refund Counter
DC

Not on the shop floor
 Some evidence of security staff involvement



Process Failures and Offending

Inadequate Security Searches
 Till PIN Abuse

- Poor Till Procedures: Emptying and Checking
- Abuse of Staff Exit Policies
- Poor Use of Security Cage
- Unauthorised Access to Warehouse
- Lack of Supervision at Night



Offending and Prevention

Role of CCTV

- Staff Searches
- Better Training on Use of Till
- Staff Awareness of Security Capability
- Better Staff Screening
- More Awareness of Company Policies
- Greater Degree of Supervision and Checking



Data Mining Capacity at the Till

- Regular Investigations
- Regular Advertising
- Development of Key Deviance Indicators
- Setting of Tolerance Levels
- Store Level Access to Reports
- Staff Monitoring
 - Night Shift
 - Backroom Areas
 - Random Searching
 - Use of CCTV
 - Till Operator Performance Meetings



Regular Review of Key Vulnerable Processes

- Monitoring of Adherence
 - Stock Deliveries
 - Security Cage
 - Markdowns
- Product Vulnerability Reviews
 - Has the Focus Moved?
 - Product Checking in the Warehouse
 - Goods Stored in the Secure Cage



Staff Awareness Programmes Capabilities of Data Mining Function Capabilities of Surveillance – Risk and Consequence - Need to be Overt and Regular Management Performance Reviews Importance of Example Setting Monitoring of Security Staff



Sharing Data on Previous Offenders

 Deterrent Impact
 Reduce Access to Previous Offenders

 Reward/Incentivise Staff

 Incentivise Intolerance

 Create a Culture of Honesty



Conclusions

New insights
Relative simplicity of offending
Till highly vulnerable
Importance of surveillance
Role of checks and balances
Staff integrity
Non scanning of goods



Thank you for listening

For a free copy of the report contact me at: bna@le.ac.uk

